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Abstract
We present a theory of choice among lotteries in which the decision maker's attention is drawn
to (precisely dened) salient payos. This leads the decision maker to a context-dependent repre-
sentation of lotteries in which true probabilities are replaced by decision weights distorted in favor
of salient payos. By specifying decision weights as a function of payos, our model provides a novel
and unied account of many empirical phenomena, including frequent risk-seeking behavior, invari-
ance failures such as the Allais paradox, and preference reversals. It also yields new predictions,
including some that distinguish it from Prospect Theory, which we test.
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Over the last several decades, social scientists have identied a range of important violations
of Expected Utility Theory, the standard theory of choice under risk. Perhaps at the most
basic level, in both experiments and everyday life, people frequently exhibit both risk loving
and risk averse behavior, depending on the situation. As rst stressed by Friedman and
Savage (1948), people participate in unfair gambles, pick highly risky occupations (includ-
ing entrepreneurship) over safer ones, and invest without diversication in individual risky
stocks, while simultaneously buying insurance. Attitudes towards risk are unstable in this
very basic sense.
This systematic instability underlies several paradoxes of choice under risk. As shown
by Allais (1953), people switch from risk loving to risk averse choices among two lotteries
after a common consequence is added to both, in contradiction to the independence axiom
of Expected Utility Theory. Another form of instability is preference reversals (Lichtenstein
and Slovic, 1971): in comparing two lotteries with a similar expected value, experimental
subjects choose the safer lottery but are willing to pay more for the riskier one. Camerer
(1995) reviews numerous attempts to amend the axioms of Expected Utility Theory to deal
with these ndings, but these attempts have not been conclusive.
We propose a new psychologically founded model of choice under risk, which naturally
exhibits the systematic instability of risk preferences and accounts for the puzzles. In this
model, risk attitudes are driven by the salience of dierent lottery payos. Psychologists
view salience detection as a key attentional mechanism enabling humans to focus their lim-
ited cognitive resources on a relevant subset of the available sensory data. As Taylor and
Thompson (1982) put it: \Salience refers to the phenomenon that when one's attention
is dierentially directed to one portion of the environment rather than to others, the in-
formation contained in that portion will receive disproportionate weighting in subsequent
judgments." According to Kahneman (2011, p. 324), \our mind has a useful capability to
focus on whatever is odd, dierent or unusual." We call the payos that draw the decision
maker's attention \salient". The decision maker is then risk seeking when a lottery's upside
is salient and risk averse when its downside is salient. More generally, salience allows for atheory of context dependent choice consistent with a broad range of evidence.
We build a model of decision making in which salient lottery payos are overweighted.
Our main results rely on three assumptions. Two of them, which we label ordering and
diminishing sensitivity, formalize the salience of payos. Roughly speaking, a lottery payo
is salient if it is very dierent in percentage terms from the payos of other available lotteries
(in the same state of the world). This specication of salience captures the ideas that: i)
we attend to dierences rather than absolute values (Kahneman, 2003), and ii) we perceive
changes on a log scale (Weber's law). Our third assumption states that the extent to
which decision weights are distorted depends on the salience of the associated payos, and
not on the underlying probabilities. This assumption implies (see Proposition 1) that low
probabilities are relatively more distorted than high ones, in accordance with Kahneman and
Tversky's (1979) observation that people have \limited ability to comprehend and evaluate
extreme probabilities". We describe how, under these assumptions, the decision maker
develops a context-dependent representation of each lottery. Aside from replacing objective
probabilities with decision weights, the decision maker's valuation of payos is standard.
At a broad level, our approach is similar to that pursued by Gennaioli and Shleifer (2010)
in their study of the representativeness heuristic in probability judgments. The idea of both
studies is that decision makers do not take into account fully all the information available
to them, but rather over-emphasize the information their minds focus on.1 Gennaioli and
Shleifer (2010) call such decision makers local thinkers, because they neglect potentially
important but unrepresentative data. Here, analogously, in evaluating lotteries, decision
makers overweight states that draw their attention and neglect states that do not. We
continue to refer to such decision makers as local thinkers. In both models, the limiting case
in which all information is processed correctly is the standard economic decision maker.
Our model describes factors that encourage and discourage risk seeking, but also leads
to an explanation of the Allais paradoxes. The strongest departures from Expected Utility
Theory in our model occur in the presence of extreme payos, particularly when these occur
with a low probability. Due to this property, our model predicts that subjects in the Allais
experiments are risk loving when the common consequence is small and attention is drawn
1Other models in the same spirit are Mullainathan (2002), Schwartzstein (2009) and Gabaix (2011).
2to the highest lottery payos, and risk averse when the common consequence is large and
attention is drawn to the lowest payos. We explore the model's predictions by describing,
and then experimentally testing, how Allais paradoxes can be turned on and o. We also
show that preference reversals can be seen as a consequence of lottery evaluation in dierent
contexts that aect salience, rather than the result of a fundamental dierence between
pricing and choosing. The model thus provides a unied explanation of risk preferences and
invariance violations based on a psychologically motivated mechanism of salience.
It is useful to compare our model to the gold standard of behavioral theories of choice
under risk, Kahneman and Tversky's (KT, 1979) Prospect Theory. Like Prospect Theory,
our model incorporates the assumption that decision makers focus on payos, rather than
on absolute wealth levels, when evaluating risky alternatives (although in our model this
happens through payo salience and not through the value function). Prospect Theory
also incorporates the assumption that the probability weights people use to make choices
are dierent from objective probabilities. But the idea that these weights depend on the
actual payos and their salience is new here. In some situations, our decision weights look
very similar to KT's, but in other situations { for instance when small probabilities are not
attached to salient payos or when lotteries are correlated { they are very dierent. We
conduct multiple experiments, both of simple risk attitudes and of Allais paradoxes with
correlated states, which distinguish our predictions from KT's, and uniformly nd strong
support for our model of probability weighting.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we provide the basic intuition for how
the salience of lottery payos shapes risk attitudes in the context of Allais' \common con-
sequence" paradox. In Section 3, we present a salience-based model of choice among two
lotteries. In Section 4, we use this model to study risk attitudes, derive from rst principles
Prospect Theory's weighting function for a class of choice problems where it should apply,
and provide experimental evidence for our predictions. In Section 5 we show that our model
accounts for the Allais paradoxes, as well as for preference reversals, a phenomenon that
Prospect Theory cannot accommodate. We obtain further predictions for context eects
(which Prospect Theory also cannot accomodate), such as turning the Allais paradoxes or
preference reversals on and o depending on the description of payo states, and nd exper-
3imental support for these predictions. We then describe how the model deals with losses and
addresses reection and framing eects. In Section 6, we take stock of the model's predic-
tions, and compare it to alternative models of choice under risk. Section 7 concludes. Proofs
of the results in the text can be found in the Appendix. As Supplementary Material, Online
Appendix 1 presents additional results on preference reversals and failures of transitivity,
addresses mixed lotteries, and extends the model to choice among many lotteries. Online
Appendix 2 provides a detailed account of the experimental procedures and results.
2 Salience and the Allais Paradox
The Allais paradoxes (1953) are the best known and most discussed instances of failure
of the independence axiom of Expected Utility Theory. Kahneman and Tversky's (1979)
version of the \common consequence" paradox asks experimental subjects to choose among
two lotteries L1(z) and L2(z):
L1(z) =
8
> > > <
> > > :
$2500 with prob. 0:33
$0 0:01
$z 0:66
, L2(z) =
8
<
:
$2400 with prob. 0:34
$z 0:66
, (1)
for dierent values of the payo z. By the independence axiom, an expected utility maximizer
should not change his choice as the common consequence z is varied, since z cancels out in
the comparison between L1(z) and L2(z).
In experiments, for z = 2400, most subjects are risk averse, preferring L2(2400) to
L1(2400):
L1(2400) =
8
> > > <
> > > :
$2500 with prob. 0:33
$0 0:01
$2400 0:66
 L2(2400) =
n
$2400 with prob. 1 .
(2)
When however z = 0, most subjects are risk seeking, preferring L1(0) to L2(0):
4L1(0) =
8
<
:
$2500 with prob. 0:33
$0 0:34
 L2(0) =
8
<
:
$2400 with prob. 0:34
$0 0:66
. (3)
In violation of the independence axiom, z aects the experimental subjects' choices,
causing switches between risk averse and risk seeking behavior. Prospect Theory (KT 1979
and TK 1992) explains these switches as follows. When z = 2400, the low 0:01 probability
of getting zero in L1(2400) is overweighted, generating risk aversion. When z = 0, the extra
0:01 probability of getting zero in L1(0) is not overweighted, generating risk seeking. This
eect is directly built into the probability weighting function (p) by the assumption of
subcertainty, e.g. (0:34)   (0) < 1   (0:66).2
Our explanation of the Allais paradox does not rely on a xed weighting function (p).
Rather, it relies on how decision weights change as the payo z alters the salience of dierent
lottery outcomes. Roughly speaking, in the choice between L1(2400) and L2(2400), the
downside of $0 feels a lot lower than the sure payo of $2400. The upside of $2500, however,
feels only slightly higher than the sure payo. Because the lottery's downside is more salient
than its upside, the subjects focus on the downside when making their decisions. This focus
triggers the risk averse choice.
In contrast, in the choice between L1(0) and L2(0), both lotteries have the same downside
risk of zero. Now the upside of winning $2500 in the riskier lottery L1(0) is more salient
and subjects focus on it when making their decisions. This focus triggers the risk seeking
choice. The analogy here is to sensory perception: a lottery's salient payos are those
which dier most from the payos of alternative lotteries. The decision maker's mind then
focuses on salient payos, inating their weights when making a choice. Section 5 provides
a fuller account of the Allais experiment, which also highlights the role played by the level
of objective probabilities.
2In Cumulative Prospect Theory (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992) the mathematical condition on proba-
bility weights is slightly dierent but carries the same intuition: the common consequence is more valuable
when associated with a sure rather than a risky prospect.
53 The Model
A choice problem is described by: i) a set of states of the world S, where each state s 2 S
occurs with objective and known probability s such that
P
s2S s = 1, and ii) a choice set
fL1;L2g, where the Li are risky prospects that yield monetary payos xi
s in each state s.
For convenience, we refer to Li as lotteries.3 Here we focus on choice between two lotteries,
leaving the general case of choice among N > 2 lotteries to Section 6.
The decision maker uses a value function v to evaluate lottery payos relative to the
reference point of zero.4 Through most of the paper, we illustrate the mechanism generating
risk preferences in our model by assuming a linear value function v (in online Appendix 1,
when we focus on mixed lotteries, we consider a piece-wise linear value function featuring loss
aversion, as in Prospect Theory). Absent distortions in decision weights, the local thinker
evaluates Li as:
V (Li) =
X
s2S
sv(x
i
s). (4)
The local thinker (LT) departs from Equation (4) by overweighting the lottery's most salient
states in S. Salience distortions work in two steps. First, a salience ranking among the states
in S is established for each lottery Li. Second, based on this salience ranking the probability
s in (4) is replaced by a transformed, lottery specic decision weight i
s. To formally dene
salience, let xs = (xi
s)i=1;2 be the vector listing the lotteries' payos in state s and denote
by x i
s the payo in s of lottery Lj;j 6= i. Let xmin
s ;xmax
s respectively denote the largest and
smallest payos in xs.
Denition 1 The salience of state s for lottery Li, i = 1;2, is a continuous and bounded
function (xi
s;x i
s ) that satises three conditions:
3Formally, Li are acts, or random variables, dened over the choice problem's probability space (S;FS;),
where S is assumed to be nite and FS is its canonical -algebra. However, as we will see in Equation (11),
the decision maker's choice depends only on the Li's joint distribution over payos and not on the exact
structure of the state space. Thus we use the term lotteries, in a slight abuse of nomenclature relative to
the usual denition of lotteries as probability distributions over payos.
4This is a form of narrow framing, also used in Prospect Theory. Koszegi and Rabin (2006, 2007) build a
model of reference point formation and use it to study shifts in risk attitudes. Their model cannot account for
situations where expectations and thus reference points are held xed (such as lab experiments we consider
here). Our approaches are complementary, as one could combine our model of decision weights with Koszegi
and Rabin's two part value function.
61) Ordering. If for states s,e s 2 S we have that [xmin
s ;xmax
s ] is a subset of [xmin
~ s ;xmax
~ s ], then

 
x
i
s;x
 i
s

< 
 
x
i
e s;x
 i
e s

2) Diminishing sensitivity. If xj
s > 0 for j = 1;2, then for any  > 0,
(x
i
s + ;x
 i
s + ) < (x
i
s;x
 i
s )
3) Reection. For any two states s, e s 2 S such that xj
s;x
j
~ s > 0 for j = 1;2, we have
(x
i
s;x
 i
s ) < (x
i
~ s;x
 i
~ s ) if and only if ( x
i
s; x
 i
s ) < ( x
i
~ s; x
 i
~ s )
Section 3.1 discusses the connection between these properties and the cognitive notion
of salience. The key properties driving our explanations of anomalies are ordering and
diminishing sensitivity. The reection property only plays a role in section 5.3 when we
consider lotteries which yield negative payos. To illustrate Denition 1, consider the salience
function:
(x
i
s;x
 i
s ) =
jxi
s   x i
s j
jxi
sj + jx i
s j + 
, (5)
where  > 0. According to the ordering property, the salience of a state for Li increases in
the distance between its payo xi
s and the payo x i
s of the alternative lottery. In (5), this is
captured by the numerator jxi
s x i
s j. Diminishing sensitivity implies that salience decreases
as a state's average (absolute) payo gets farther from zero, as captured by the denominator
term jx1
sj + jx2
sj in (5). Finally, according to reection, salience is shaped by the magnitude
rather than the sign of payos: a state is salient not only when the lotteries bring sharply
dierent gains, but also when they bring sharply dierent losses. In (5), reection takes the
strong form (xi
s;x i
s ) = ( xi
s; x i
s ). These properties are illustrated in Figure 1 below.
The salience function in specication (5) satises additional properties besides those of
Denition 1. For instance, it is symmetric, namely (x1
s;x2
s) = (x2
s;x1
s), which is a natural
property in the case of two lotteries but which is dropped with N > 2 lotteries. Although
our main results rely only on ordering and diminishing sensitivity, we sometimes use the
7Figure 1: Properties of a salience function, Eq. (5)
tractable functional form (5) to illustrate our model.
Consider the choice between L1(z) and L2(z) introduced in Section 2. When the common
consequence is z = 2400, the possible payo states are S = f(2500;2400); (0;2400);(2400;2400)g.
We then have:
(0;2400) > (2500;2400) > (2400;2400). (6)
The inequalities follow from diminishing sensitivity and ordering, respectively, and can be
easily veried for Equation (5). The state in which the riskier lottery L1(2400) loses is the
most salient one (which causes risk aversion).5 A similar calculation shows that, when the
common consequence is z = 0, the state (2500;0) in which the risky lottery L1(0) wins is the
most salient one, which points to risk seeking. In short, changing the common consequence
aects the salience of lottery payos, as described in Section 2. Section 5.1 provides a full
analysis of the Allais paradoxes.
5In this example, constructing the state space from the alternatives of choice is straightforward. Section
3.2 discusses how the state space S is constructed in more complex cases.
83.1 Salience, Decision Weights and Risk Attitudes
Given a salience function , for each lottery Li the local thinker ranks the states and distorts
their decision weights as follows:
Denition 2 Given states s;e s 2 S, we say that for lottery Li state s is more salient than ~ s
if (xi
s;x i
s ) > (xi
e s;x
 i
e s ). Let ki
s 2 f1;:::;jSjg be the salience ranking of state s for Li, with
lower ki
s indicating higher salience. All states with the same salience obtain the same ranking
(and the ranking has no jumps). Then, if s is more salient than e s, namely if ki
s < ki
e s, the
local thinker transforms the odds e s=s of e s relative to s into the odds i
e s=i
s, given by:
i
e s
i
s
= 
ki
e s ki
s 
e s
s
(7)
where  2 (0;1]. By normalizing
P
s i
s = 1 and dening !i
s = ki
s=
P
r ki
r  r

, the
decision weight attached by the local thinker to a generic state s in the evaluation of Li is:

i
s = s  !
i
s: (8)
The local thinker evaluates a lottery by inating the relative weights attached to the
lottery's most salient states. Parameter  measures the extent to which salience distorts
decision weights, capturing the degree of local thinking. When  = 1, the decision maker is a
standard economic decision maker: his decision weights coincide with objective probabilities
(i.e., !i
s = 1). When  < 1, the decision maker is a local thinker, namely he overweights the
most salient states and underweights the least salient ones. Specically, s is overweighted if
and only if it is more salient than average (!i
s > 1, or ki
s >
P
r ki
r  r). The case where
 ! 0 describes the local thinker who focuses only on a lottery's most salient payos.
The critical property of Denition 2 is that the parameter  does not depend on the
objective state probabilities. We discuss the cognitive motivations for this assumption in
Section 3.1. This specication implies:
Proposition 1 If the probability of state s is increased by ds = hs, where h is a positive
constant, and the probabilities of other states are reduced while keeping their odds constant,
9i.e. de s =   s
1 sh  e s for all e s 6= s, then:
d!i
s
h
=  
s
1   s
 !
i
s 
 
!
i
s   1

. (9)
Proposition 1 (see the Appendix for proofs) states that an increase in a state's probability
s reduces the distortion of the decision weight in that state by driving !i
s closer to 1. That
is, low probability states are subject to the strongest distortions:6 they are over-weighted
if salient and under-weighted otherwise. In contrast to KT's (1979,1992) assumption, low
probability (high rank) payos are not always overweighted in our model; they are only
overweighted if they are salient, regardless of probability (and rank). In accordance with KT,
however, the largest distortions of choice occur precisely when salient payos are relatively
unlikely. This property plays a key role for explaining some important ndings such as the
common ratio Allais Paradox in Section 5.1.7
Given Denitions 1 and 2, the local thinker computes the value of lottery Li as:
V
LT(Li) =
X
s2S

i
sv(x
i
s) =
X
s2S
s!
i
sv(x
i
s). (10)
Thus, Li's evaluation always lies between the value of its highest and lowest payos.
Since salience is dened on the state space S, one may wonder whether splitting states,
or generally considering a dierent state space compatible with the lotteries' payo distri-
butions, may aect the local thinker's evaluation (10). We denote by X the set of dis-
tinct payo combinations of L1, L2 occurring in S with positive probability, and by Sx the
set of states in S where the lotteries yield the same payo combination x 2 X, formally
Sx  fs 2 S jxs = xg. Clearly, S = [x2XSx. By Denition 1, all states s in Sx are equally
salient for either lottery, and thus have the same value of !i
s, which for simplicity we denote
6This follows from the normalization of the decision weights. Since the expected distortion is zero, P
i i!i
s = 1, and since the distortion factor !i
s for state s does not depend directly on its probability, states
with lower probabilities are relatively more distorted.
7Proposition 1 can also be stated in terms of payos: if lottery Li yields payo xk with probability pk,
then increasing pk while reducing the probabilities pk0 of other payos xk0 (keeping their odds constant)
decreases the distortion of pk if and only if xk is more salient than average. That is, in a given choice
context, the probabilities of unlikely payos are relatively more distorted (see the Appendix for details).
10!i
x. Using (8) we can rewrite V LT(Li) in (10) as:
V
LT(Li) =
X
x2X
 
X
s2Sx
s
!
!
i
xv(x
i
x); (11)
where xi
x denotes Li's payo in x. Equation (11) says that the state space only inuences
evaluation through the total probability of each distinct payo combination x, namely x =
P
s2Sx s. This is because salience (:;) depends on payos, and not on the probabilities
of dierent states. Hence, splitting a given probability x across dierent sets of states
does not aect evaluation (or choice) in our model. There is therefore no loss in generality
from viewing S as the \minimal" state space X identied by the set of distinct payo
combinations that occur with positive probability. In the remainder of the paper, we keep
the notation of Equation (10), with the understanding that S is this \minimal" state space
(and omit the reference to the underlying lotteries).
In a choice between two lotteries, Equation (10) implies that - due to the symmetry of
the salience function (i.e. k1
s = k2
s for all s) - the local thinker prefers L1 to L2 if and only if:
X
s2S

kss

v(x
1
s)   v(x
2
s)

> 0. (12)
For  = 1, the local thinker's decision weights coincide with the corresponding objective
probabilities. For  < 1, local thinking favors L1 when it pays more than L2 in the more
salient (and thus less discounted) states.
3.2 Discussion of Assumptions and Setup
Salience and Decision Weights
In our model the choice context shapes decision makers' perception of lotteries through
the mechanism of payo salience. The properties of the salience function seek to formalize
features of human perception, which we believe { in line with Kahneman, Tversky, and others
{ to be relevant for choice under risk. The intensity with which we perceive a signal, such
as a light source, increases in the signal's magnitude but also depends on context (Kandel et
al, 1991). Analogously, in choice under risk the signals are the dierences in lottery payos
11across states. Via the ordering property, the salience function (:;:) captures the signal's
magnitude in a given state. The role of context is captured by diminishing sensitivity (and
reection): the intensity with which payos in a state are perceived increases as the state's
payos approach the status quo of zero, which is our measure of context.8
Consistent with psychology of attention, we assume that the decision maker evaluates
lotteries by focusing on, and weighting more, their most salient states. The \local thinking"
parameter 1= captures the strength of the decision maker's focus on salient states, proxying
for his ability to pay attention to multiple aspects, cognitive load, or simply intelligence.
Our assumption of rank-based discounting buys us analytical tractability, but our main re-
sults also hold if the distortion of the odds in (7) is a smooth increasing function of salience
dierences, for instance [(xi
s;x i
s ) (xi
e s;x i
e s )].9 One benet of this alternative specication is
that it would avoid discontinuities in valuation. However, discontinuities play no role in our
analysis, so for simplicity we stick to ranking-based discounting. The main substantive re-
striction embodied in our model is that the discounting function does not depend on a state's
probability, which implies that unlikely states are subject to the greatest distortions. This
notion is also encoded in Prospect Theory's weigthing function, in which \highly unlikely
events are either ignored or overweighted, " (KT 1979). Together with subadditivity, this
feature, also present in early work on probability weigthing (Edwards 1962, Fellner 1961),
allows KT to account for risk loving behavior and the Allais paradoxes. Quiggin's (1982)
rank-dependent expected utility and Tversky and Kahneman's (1992) Cumulative Prospect
Theory (CPT) develop weigthing functions in which the rank order of a lottery's payos
8As in Weber's law of diminishing sensitivity, in which a change in luminosity is perceived less intensely if
it occurs at a higher luminosity level, the local thinker perceives less intensely payo dierences occurring at
high (absolute) payo levels. Interestingly, visual perception and risk taking seem to be connected at a more
fundamental neurological level. McCoy and Platt (2005) show in a visual gambling task that when monkeys
made risky choices neuronal activity increased in an area of the brain (CGp, the posterior cingulate cortex)
linked to visual orienting and reward processing. Crucially, the activation of CGp was better predicted by
the subjective salience of a risky option than by its actual value, leading the authors to hypothesize that
\enhanced neuronal activity associated with risky rewards biases attention spatially, marking large payos
as salient for guiding behavior (p. 1226)."
9A smooth specication would also address a concern with the current model that states with similar
salience may obtain very dierent weights. This implies that i) splitting states and slightly altering payos
could have a large impact on choice, and ii) in choice problems with many states the (slightly) less salient
states are eectively ignored. However, since none of our results is due to these eects, we stick to rank-based
discounting for simplicity.
12aects probability weighting.10
Our theory exhibits two sharp dierences from these works. First, in our model the mag-
nitude of payos, not only their rank, determines salience and probability weights: unlikely
events are overweighted when they are associated with salient payos, but underweighted
otherwise. As a consequence, the lottery upside may still be underweighted if the payo
associated with it is not suciently high. As we show in Section 4, this feature is crucial
to explaining shifts in risk attitudes. Second, and more important, in our model decision
weights depend on the choice context, namely on the available alternatives as they are pre-
sented to the decision maker. In Section 5 we exploit this feature to shed light on the
psychological forces behind the Allais paradoxes and preference reversals.
Our main results rely on ordering and diminishing sensitivity of (;), as well as on
the comparatively larger distortion of low probabilities. We however sometimes illustrate
the model by using the more restrictive salience function in Equation (5), which oers a
tractable case characterized by only two parameters (;). This allows us to look for ranges
of  and  that are consistent with the observed choice patterns.
The State Space
Salience is a property of states of nature that depends on the lottery payos that occur
in each state, as they are presented to the decision maker. The assumption that payos
(rather than nal wealth states) shape the perception of states is a form of narrow framing,
consistent with the fact that payos are perceived as gains and losses relative to the status
quo, as in Prospect Theory.
In our approach, the state space S and the states' objective probabilities are a given of the
choice problem.11 In the lab, specifying a state space for a choice problem is straightforward
when the feasible payo combinations { and their probabilities { are available, for instance
when lotteries are explicitly described as contingencies based on a randomizing device. For
example, L1  (10;0:5; 5;0:5) and L2  (7;0:5; 9;0:5) give rise to four payo combinations
f(10;7);(10;9);(5;7);(5;9)g if they are played by ipping two separate coins, but only to
10Prelec (1998) axiomatizes a set of theories of choice based on probability weighting, which include CPT.
For a recent attempt to estimate the probability weighting function, see Wu and Gonzalez (1996).
11In particular, we do not address choice problems where outcome probabilities are ambiguous, such as
the Ellsberg paradox. This is an important direction for future work. Similarly, the salience-based decision
weights are not to be understood as subjective probabilities.
13two payo combinations f(10;7);(5;9)g if they are contingent on the same coin ip. In
our experiments, we nearly always describe the lotteries' correlation structure by specifying
the state space. However, classic experiments such as the Allais paradoxes provide less
information: they involve a choice between (standard) lotteries, and the state space is not
explicitly described. In this case, we assume that our decision maker treats the lotteries
as independent, which implies that the state space is the product space induced by the
lotteries' marginal distributions over payos.12 Intuitively, salience detects the starkest payo
dierences among lotteries unless some of these dierences are explicitly ruled out.
For the choice problems we study, the choice set and thus the state space are unam-
biguous. All our results are obtained by equating the choice set with the set of options the
decision maker is actively considering (the consideration set). In real world applications,
however, the consideration set need not coincide with the choice set. In some situations,
the decision maker may in fact consider only a subset of the available options. For example,
he may discard universally dominated lotteries from his choice set before evaluating other,
more attractive, lotteries. As another example, suppose that the payos of two lotteries are
determined by the roll of the same dice. One lottery pays 1,2,3,4,5,6, according to the dice's
face; the other lottery pays 2,3,4,5,6,1. The state in which the rst lottery pays 6 and the
second pays 1 may appear most salient to the decision maker, leading him to prefer the rst
lottery. Of course, a moment's thought would lead him to realize that the lotteries are just
rearrangements of each other, and recognize them as identical. In the following, we assume
that, before evaluating lotteries, the decision maker edits the choice set by discarding all but
one of the lottery permutations (at random, thus preserving indierence between the permu-
tations). Both forms of editing are plausibly related to salience itself: in these cases, before
comparing payos, what is salient to the decision maker are the properties of permutation
or dominance of certain lotteries.
In other situations, the consideration set may be larger than the actual choice set, for
instance when the choice problem itself reminds the decision maker of options that are not
actually available for choice. In this case, options outside the choice set may inuence salience
12In online Appendix 2 we provide experimental evidence consistent with this assumption, as well as details
on the information given in the experimental surveys.
14and choice. This perspective provides insight into the endowment eect, as shown in (BGS
2012), and into puzzles in consumer choice such as decoy eects and context-dependent
willingness to pay for goods, as shown in (BGS 2011). Here this issue arises only in our
discussion of preference reversals, where we argue that when people evaluate a lottery in
isolation, they might compare it to the alternative of having nothing (see Section 5.2).
Endogenizing the consideration set is an important direction for future work. There is
a large literature on this topic in marketing and a growing one in decision theory (e.g.,
Manzini and Mariotti 2007, Masatlioglu, Nakajima and Ozbay 2010), but a consensus model
has not yet emerged. In a similar spirit, the model could be generalized to take into account
determinants of salience other than payo values, such as prior experiences and details
of presentation, or even color of font. These may matter in some situations but are not
considered here.
Salience and Context Dependent Choice
We are not the rst to propose a model of context dependent choice among lotteries.
Rubinstein (1988), followed by Aizpurua et al (1990) and Leland (1994), builds a model
of similarity-based preferences, in which decision makers simplify the choice among two
lotteries by pruning the dimension (probability or payo, if any), along which lotteries are
similar. The working and predictions of our model are dierent from Rubinstein's, even
though we share the idea that the common ratio Allais paradox (see Section 5.1.2) is due to
subjects' focus on lottery payos. Loomes (2010) proposes a model which is closely related to
Rubinstein's, and presents evidence which suggests a role for probability comparisons across
lotteries in choice. In Regret Theory (Loomes and Sugden 1982, Bell 1982, Fishburn 1982),
the choice set directly aects the decision maker's utility via a regret/rejoice term added
to a standard utility function. In our model, instead, context aects decisions by shaping
the salience of payos and decision weights. Regret Theory shares with our model the idea
that states with higher payo dierences have a disproportionate eect on choices. In that
theory, decision makers get (dis)utility from comparing foregone outcomes. Regret theory
can account for a certain type of context dependence, such as a role for correlations among
lotteries; however, by adopting a traditional utility theory perspective, it cannot capture
framing eects or violations of procedural invariance (Tversky, Slovic and Kahneman 1990).
15Moreover, since Regret Theory does not feature diminishing sensitivity (as it excludes the
notion of a reference point), it has a hard time accounting for standard patterns of risk
preferences, including risk averse preferences for fair 50-50 gambles over gains and their
reection over losses.
Formal models of context dependent choice (e.g. Fishburn 1982) may be criticized as
not being falsiable because too many choice patterns can be justied. We stress that
our psychologically based assumptions of ordering and diminishing sensitivity place tight
restrictions on the predictions of our model under any value (and salience) function. To
give one example, both the ordering and the diminising sensitivity property make strong
predictions regarding the conditions for, and the directionality of, the Allais paradox. In
particular, they imply that the independence axiom of Expected Utility Theory should hold
when the mixture lotteries are correlated (see Section 5.1). To give another example, the
distortion of decision weights in Denition 2 implies that pairwise choice among two or
three outcome independent lotteries having the same support is transitive and that choice is
consistent with rst order stochastic dominance when lotteries are independent (see online
Appendix 1). In future work, it may be useful to uncover the precise axioms consistent with
Denitions 1 and 2.
4 Salience and Attitudes Towards Risk
We rst describe how salience aects the risk preferences of a local thinker with linear utility.
To do so, consider the choice between a sure prospect L0 = (x;1) and a mean preserving
spread L1 = (x + g; g; x   l; 1   g), with gg = (1   g)l. All payos are positive. In this
choice, there are two states: sg = (x + g;x), in which the lottery gains relative to the sure
prospect, and sl = (x   l;x), in which the lottery loses.
Since L1 is a mean preserving spread of L0, Equation (12) implies that for any  < 1, a
local thinker with linear utility chooses the lottery if and only if the gain state sg is more
salient than the loss state sl, i.e. when (x + g;x) > (x   l;x). In this case, using the
notation of Denition 2, the weight 1
g attached to the event of winning under the lottery is
higher than the event's probability g. As a result, the local thinker perceives the expected
16value of L1 to be above that of L0, and exhibits risk seeking behavior, choosing L1 over L0.
Using the fact that gg = (1   g)l, the condition for sg to be more salient than sl can
be written as:


x +
1   g
g
 l;x

>  (x   l;x). (13)
The ordering property of salience has two implications. First, when the state sg is very
unlikely, it is also salient: at g ' 0 the lottery's upside is very large, its salience is high,
and (13) always holds. Second, the salience of sg decreases in g: as the lottery wins with
higher probability, its payo gain g is lower and thus less salient. Thus, Equation (13) is less
likely to hold as g rises. The diminishing sensitivity property in turn implies that when
the lottery gain is equal to the loss (i.e., g = l), the loss is salient. As a consequence, when
g = 1=2 the state sg is less salient than sl, so (13) is violated.
As a result, condition (13) identies a probability threshold 
g < 1=2 such that: for g <

g the lottery upside is salient, the local thinker overweights it and behaves in a risk seeking
way; for g > 
g the lottery downside is salient, the local thinker overweights it and behaves
in a risk averse way; for g = 
g states sg and sl are equally salient and the local thinker is risk
neutral. Remarkably, these properties of decision weights recover key features of Prospect
Theory's inverse S-shaped probability weighting function (KT 1979): over-weighting of low
probabilities, and under-weighting of high probabilities. Indeed, Figure 2 shows the decision
weight 1
g as a function of probability g. Low probabilities are over-weighted because
they are associated with salient upsides of longshot lotteries. High probabilities are under-
weighted as they occur in lotteries with a small, non salient, upside.
Note however that in our model the weighting function is context dependent. In contrast
to Prospect Theory, overweighting depends not only on the probability of a state but also
on the salience of its payo in (13). In particular, overweighting is shaped by the average
level of payos x. To see this, denote by r = vLT (L0) vLT (L1) the \premium" required by
the local thinker to be indierent between the risky option L1 and the sure prospect L0 (r
is positive when the local thinker is risk averse). For a rational decision maker with linear
utility, r = 0 regardless of the payo level x. To see how the local thinker's risk attitudes
17Figure 2: Context dependent probability weighting function
depend on x, consider the following denition:
Denition 3 A salience function is convex if, for any state with positive payos (y;z) and
any x; > 0, the dierence (y + x;z + x)   (y + x + ;z + x + ) is a decreasing function
of the payo level x. A salience function is concave if this dierence increases in x.
A salience function is convex if diminishing sensitivity becomes weaker as the payo level x
rises. The Appendix then proves:
Lemma 1 If the salience function is convex, then r = vLT (L0)   vLT (L1) weakly decreases
with x. Conversely, if the salience function is concave then r weakly increases with x.
If convexity holds and diminishing sensitivity becomes weaker with x, then a higher payo
level weakly reduces r, increasing the valuation of the risky lottery L1 relative to that of
the safe lottery L0. In Equation (13), this increases the threshold 
g, boosting risk seeking.
If instead diminishing sensitivity becomes stronger with x, a higher payo level leads to an
increase in r, weakly decreasing L1's valuation relative to that of L0. In equation (13) this
reduces the threshold 
g, hindering risk seeking.
The salience function of Equation (5) satises convexity. Using this function, the condi-
tion (13) for sg to be more salient than sl becomes:

x +

2

(1   2g) > l  (1   g), (14)
18which is indeed more likely to hold for higher x (so long as g < 1=2).
Equation (14) implies that, holding the lottery loss l constant, risk attitudes follow Figure
3 below (where for convenience we set   l ' 0). As x rises, the threshold 
g below which
Figure 3: Shifts in risk attitudes
the decision maker is risk seeking increases, so that risk seeking behavior can occur even at
relatively high probabilities g (but never for g > 1=2, though).
We tested the predictions illustrated in Figure 3 by giving experimental subjects a se-
ries of binary choices between a mean preserving spread L1 = (x + g;g; x   l;1   g)
and a sure prospect L2 = (x;1). We set the downside of L1 at l = $20, yielding an
upside g of $20  (1   g)=g. We varied x in f$20;$100;$400;$2100;$10500g and g in
f:01;:05;:2;:33;:4;:5;:67g. For each of these 35 choice problems, we collected at least 70
responses. On average, each subject made 5 choices, several of which held either g or x
constant. The observed proportion of subjects choosing the lottery for every combination
(x;g) is reported in Table 1; for comparison with the predictions of Figure 3, the results
are shown in Figure 4.
The patterns are qualitatively consistent with the predictions of Figure 3. First, and
crucially, for any given expected value x, the proportion of risk takers falls as g increases
and there is a large drop in risk taking as g crosses 0:5. This prediction is consistent with
the probability weighting function depicted in Figure 2. Second, for a given g < 0:5, the
19Table 1: Proportion of Risk-Seeking Subjects
E
x
p
e
c
t
e
d
v
a
l
u
e
x
$10500 0:83 0:65 0:50 0:48 0:46 0:33 0:23
$2100 0:83 0:65 0:48 0:43 0:48 0:38 0:21
$400 0:60 0:58 0:44 0:47 0:33 0:30 0:23
$100 0:58 0:54 0:40 0:32 0:22 0:30 0:13
$20 0:15 0:2 0:12 0:08 0:10 0:25 0:15
0:01 0:05 0:2 0:33 0:4 0:5 0:67
Probability of gain g
Figure 4: Proportion of Risk-Seeking Subjects
proportion of risk takers increases with the expected value x. The eect is statistically
signicant: at g = 0:05 a large majority of subjects (80%) are risk averse when x = $20,
but as x increases to $2100 a large majority (65%) becomes risk seeking. This nding is
consistent with the ner hypothesis, encoded in equation (5), that diminishing sensitivity
may become weaker at higher payo levels. The increase in x raises the proportion of risk
takers from around 10% to 50% even for moderate probabilities in the range (0:2;0:4).
Although not a formal test of our theory, these patterns are broadly consistent with
the predictions of our model.13 The online Appendix 2 describes additional experiments
13The weighing function of Prospect Theory and CPT can explain why risk seeking prevails at low g,
but not the shift from risk aversion to risk seeking as x rises. To explain this nding, both theories need a
concave value function characterized by strongly diminishing returns. In the online Appendix 2 we provide
further support for these claims by showing that standard calibrations of Prospect Theory cannot explain
20on longshot lotteries whose results are also consistent with out model but inconsistent with
Prospect Theory under standard calibrations of the value function. In that Appendix we
show that using the salience function in (5) the parameter values   0:7 and   0:1
are consistent with the above evidence on risk preferences, as well as with risk preferences
concerning longshot lotteries. These values are not a formal calibration, but we employ them
as a useful reference for discussing Allais paradoxes in the next section.
5 Local Thinking and Context Dependence
5.1 The Allais Paradoxes
5.1.1 The \common consequence " Allais Paradox
Let us go back to the Allais paradox described in Section 2. We now describe the precise
conditions under which our model can explain it. Recall that subjects are asked to choose
between the lotteries:
L1(z) = (2500; 0:33; 0; 0:01; z; 0:66); L2(z) = (2400; 0:34; z; 0:66) (15)
for dierent values of z. For z = 2400, most subjects are risk averse, preferring L2(2400) to
L1(2400), while for z = 0, most subjects are risk seeking, preferring L1(0) to L2(0).
When z = 2400, the minimal state space is S = f(2500;2400);(0;2400);(2400;2400)g.
The most salient state is one where the risky lottery L2400
1 pays zero because, by ordering
and diminishing sensitivity we have:
(0;2400) > (2500;2400) > (2400;2400). (16)
our experimental ndings. For example, the calibration in Tversky and Kahneman (1992) features the value
function v(x) = x0:88, which is insuciently concave. Importantly, calibrations of the value function are
notoriously unstable: using two other sets of choice data, Wu and Gonzalez (1996) estimate v(x) = x0:5
and v(x) = x0:37, respectively. The fact that calibration is so dependent on the choice context suggests that
choice itself is context dependent.
21By Equation (12), a local thinker then prefers the riskless lottery L2(2400) provided:
 (0:01)  2400 +   (0:33)  100 < 0, (17)
which holds for  < 0:73. Although the risky lottery L1(2400) has a higher expected value,
it is not chosen when the degree of local thinking is severe, because its downside of 0 is very
salient.
Consider the choice between L1(0) and L2(0). Now both options are risky and, as dis-
cussed in Section 3, the local thinker is assumed to see the lotteries as independent. The mini-
mal state space now has four states of the world, i.e. S = f(2500;2400);(2500;0);(0;2400);(0;0)g,
whose salience ranking is:
(2500;0) > (0;2400) > (2500;2400) > (0;0). (18)
The rst inequality follows from ordering, and the second from diminishing sensitivity. By
Equation (12), a local thinker prefers the risky lottery L0
1 provided:
(0:33)  (0:66)  2500     (0:67)  (0:34)  2400 + 
2  (0:33)  (0:34)  100 > 0 (19)
which holds for   0. Any local thinker with linear utility chooses the risky lottery L1(0)
because its upside is very salient.
In sum, when  < 0:73 a local thinker exhibits the Allais paradox. This is true for
any salience function satisfying ordering and diminishing sensitivity, and thus also for the
parameterization  = 0:7,  = 0:1 obtained when using (5). It is worth spelling out the exact
intuition for this result. When z = 2400, the lottery L2400
2 is safe, whereas the lottery L2400
1
has a salient downside of zero. The local thinker focuses on this downside, leading to risk
aversion. When instead z = 0, the downside payo of the safer lottery L0
2 is also 0. As a
result, the lotteries' upsides are now crucial to determining salience. This induces the local
thinker to overweight the larger upside of L0
1, triggering risk seeking. The salience of payos
thus implies that when the same downside risk is added to the lotteries L2400
1 and L2400
2 ,
the sure prospect L2400
2 is particularly hurt because the common downside payo induces
22the decision maker to focus on the larger upside of the risky lottery, leading to risk seeking
behavior. This yields the \certainty eect" of Prospect Theory and CPT (KT 1979 and TK
1992) as a form of context dependence due to payo salience.
This role of context dependence invites the following test. Suppose that subjects are
presented the following correlated version of the lotteries L1(z) and L2(z) in Equation (15):
Probability 0:01 0:33 0:66
payo of L1(z) 0 2500 z
payo of L2(z) 2400 2400 z
(20)
where the table species the possible joint payo outcomes of the two lotteries and their
respective probabilities. Correlation changes the state space but not a lottery's distribution
over nal outcomes, so it does not aect choice under either Expected Utility Theory or
Prospect Theory. Critically, this is not true for a local thinker: the context of this correlated
version makes clear that the state in which both lotteries pay z is the least salient one, and
also that it drops from evaluation in Equation (12), so that the value of z should not aect
the choice at all. This is due to the ordering property: states where the two lotteries yield the
same payo are the least salient ones and in fact cancel out in the local thinker's valuation
(ordering leads to them being \edited out" by the local thinker). That is, in our model {
but not in Prospect Theory { the Allais paradox should not occur when L1(z) and L2(z) are
presented in the correlated form as in (20).
We tested this prediction by presenting experimental subjects correlated formats of lot-
teries L1(z) and L2(z) for z = 0 and z = 2400. The observed choice pattern is the following:
L1(2400) L2(2400)
L1(0) 7% 9%
L2(0) 11% 73%
The vast majority of subjects do not reverse their preferences (80% of choices lie on the
NW-SE diagonal), and most of them are risk averse, which in our model is also consistent with
the fact that (0;2400) is the most salient state in the correlated choice problem (20). Among
the few subjects reversing their preference, no clear pattern is detectable. This contrasts
23with the fact that our experimental subjects exhibit the Allais paradox when lotteries are
presented in an uncorrelated form (see the online Appendix 2, Supplementary Material).
Thus, when the lotteries pay the common consequence in the same state, choice is invariant
to z and the Allais paradox disappears. Our model accounts for this fact because, as the
common consequence z is made evident by correlation, it becomes non-salient. As a result,
subjects prune it and choose based on the remaining payos.14
This result captures Savage's (1972, pg. 102) argument in defense of the normative char-
acter of the \sure thing principle", and validates his thought experiment. Other experiments
in the literature are consistent with our results. Conlisk (1989) examines a related variation
of the Allais choice problem, in which each alternative is given in compound form involving
two simple lotteries, with one of the simple lotteries yielding the common consequence z.
Birnbaum and Schmidt (2010) present the Allais problem in split form, singling out the
common consequence z in each lottery. In both cases, the Allais reversals subside. Our
model also rationalizes the disappearance of the Allais paradox in Colinsk's (1989) second
example, which uses non-boundary lotteries. See also Harrison (1994) for related work on
the common consequence paradox.
5.1.2 The \common ratio" Allais Paradox
We now turn to the \common ratio" paradox, which occurs in the choice between lotteries:
L1(
0) = (6000; 
0; 0; 1   
0); L2() = (  6000; ; 0; 1   ), (21)
where L1(0) is riskier than L2() in the sense that it pays a larger positive amount ( < 1)
with a smaller probability (0 < ). By the independence axiom, an expected utility
14We tested the robustness of the correlation result by changing the choice problem in several ways: 1) we
framed the correlations verbally (e.g. described how the throw of a common die determined both lotteries'
payos), 2) we repeated the experiment with uncertain real world events, instead of lotteries, and 3) we
varied the ordering of questions, the number of ller questions, and payos. As online Appendix 2 shows,
our results are robust to all these variations. We also ran an experiment where subjects were explicitly
presented the lotteries of Equation (15) with z = 2400 as uncorrelated, with a state space consisting of the
four possible states. The choice pattern exhibited by subjects is: i) very similar to the one exhibited when
the state space is not explicitly presented, validating our basic assumption that a decision maker assumes
the lotteries to be uncorrelated when this is not specied otherwise, and ii) very dierent from the choice
pattern exhibited under correlation (with 35% of subjects changing their choice as predicted by our model,
see online Appendix 2).
24maximizer with utility function v() chooses the safer lottery L2() over L1(0) when:
v(  6000) 
0

 v(6000) + v(0)

1  
0


. (22)
The choice should not vary as long as 0= is kept constant. A stark case arises when
0= = ; now the two lotteries have the same expected value and a risk averse expected
utility maximizer always prefers the safer lottery L2() to L1(0) for any . Parameter 
identies the \common ratio" between 0 and  at dierent levels of .
It is well known (KT 1979) that, contrary to the Expected Utility Theory, the choices
of experimental subjects depend on the value of : for xed 0= =  = 0:5, when  = 0:9
subjects prefer the safer lottery L2(0:9) = (3000; 0:9; 0; 0:1) to L1(0:45) = (6000; 0:45; 0;
0:55). When instead  = 0:002, subjects prefer the riskier lottery L1(0:001) = (6000; 0:001;
0; 0:999) to L2(0:002) = (3000; 0:002; 0; 0:998). This shift towards risk seeking as the
probability of winning falls has provided one of the main justications for the introduction of
the probability weigthing function. In fact, KT (1979) account for this evidence by assuming
that this function grows slower than linearly for small ; hence,  is overweighted relatively
to  at low values of , inducing the choice of L1(0) when  = 0:002.
Consider the choice between L1(0) and L2() in our model. For  = 1=2 there are four
states of the world, S = f(6000;3000);(0;3000);(6000;0);(0;0)g. Once more, ordering and
diminishing sensitivity suce to imply that the salience ranking among states is
(6000;0) > (0;3000) > (6000;3000) > (0;0). (23)
It is convenient to express the local thinker's decision as a function of the transformed
probabilities of the lottery outcomes (as opposed to those of states of the world).15 Denoting
these transformed probabilities by b 0 and b , we nd that the local thinker evaluates the odds
15From any vector of state-specic decision weights (i
s)s2S, the decision weight i(x) attached to lottery
i's payo x is equal to the sum of the decision weights of all states where lottery i pays payo x. Formally,
i(x) =
P
s2Sxi i
s where Sxi is the set of states where i pays x.
25with which the riskier lottery L1(0) pays out relative to the safer one L2() as:
^ 0
^ 
=
0


(1   p) + p2
(1   0) + 02. (24)
With a linear utility, the local thinker selects the safer lottery L2() if and only if ^ 0=^   1=2.
This implies that the local thinker chooses the safer lottery when:
 
2(1   )
2      2. (25)
As in the common ratio eect, the local thinker is risk averse when  is suciently high and
risk seeking otherwise. In particular, for  2 (0:22;1), the local thinker switches from L2(0:9)
to L1(0:001) just as experimental subjects do. This is true for any salience function satisfying
ordering and diminishing sensitivity and thus also for the parameterization  = 0:7,  = 0:1.
The intuition for this result (see Proposition 1) is that salience exerts a particularly
strong eect in low probability states. The upside of the riskier lottery L1(0) is salient at
every , creating a force toward risk seeking. Crucially, however, this force is strong precisely
when  is low. In this case, the greater salience of the risky lottery's upside blurs the small
probability dierence    0 = (1   ) between the two lotteries. When instead  is large,
the decision maker realizes that the risky lottery is much more likely to pay nothing, inducing
him to attach a large weight on the second most salient state (0;3000). This is what drives
the choice of the safe lottery L2().
Experimental evidence shows that this common ratio eect is also not robust to the
introduction of correlation. KT (1979) asked subjects to choose between two lotteries of the
type (23) in a two-stage game where in the rst stage there is a 75% probability of the game
ending without any winnings and a 25% change of going to stage two. In stage two, the
lottery chosen at the outset is played out. The presence of the rst stage is equivalent to
reducing by 75% the winning probability for both lotteries, so in terms of nal outcomes this
setting is equivalent to the setting that leads to the common ratio eect above. Crucially,
KT document that in this formulation there is no violation of the independence axiom.
In explaining this behavior, KT informally argue that individuals \edit out" the correlated
rst stage state where both lotteries pay zero. Our model yields this editing as a consequence
26of the low salience and cancellation of such state. Adding a correlated state where both
lotteries pay 0 neither aects the salience ranking in Equation (23) nor { more importantly
{ the odds ratios between states. As a result, the local thinker chooses as if he disregards
the correlated state and its probability. This is what experimental subjects do.
In sum, our model explains the Allais paradoxes as the by-product of a specic form
of context dependence working though the salience of lottery payos. Adding a common
payo to all lotteries or rescaling their probabilities changes risk preferences by changing
the salience and the weighting of the lotteries' upsides or downsides. These eects depend
on how the lotteries are presented. Adding a common payo or rescaling probabilities by
introducing into the lotteries a non-salient correlated state does not aect choice: it is too
enticing for subjects to disregard this state and to abide by the independence axiom.
5.2 Preference Reversals
Context dependence in our model can also explain the phenomenon of preference reversal
described by Lichtenstein and Slovic (1971) and conrmed by Grether and Plott (1979) and
Tversky, Slovic and Kahneman (1990). Subjects are asked to choose between a safer lottery
L, which has a high probability of a low payo, and a riskier lottery L$, which has a low
probability of a high payo (we use conventional notation for the lotteries). Subjects may
systematically choose the safer lottery L and yet state a higher minimum selling price for
the riskier lottery L$. Preferences as revealed by choice are thus the opposite of preferences
as revealed by pricing, leading to claims that choosing and pricing follow two fundamentally
dierent principles. Neither Prospect Theory nor Expected Utility Theory can rationalize
preference reversals.
To study preference reversals in our model, consider how a local thinker prices a lottery.
Given that in our model valuation is context dependent, the concept of a minimum selling
price can be interpreted in two distinct ways.16 Under the valuation approach, in jointly
16Several authors have studied preference reversals by focusing on the details of the experimental procedure,
in particular the incentive structures. Thus, Karni and Safra (1987) suggest that Grether and Plott's BDM
elicitation mechanism should be interpreted as a choice between two stage-lotteries, and that preference
reversals follow from violations of the independence axiom required to interpret elicited prices as certainty
equivalents (see also Holt (1986)). Segal (1988) suggests instead it results from violations of the reduction
axiom. Evidently, the interpretation of experimental procedures is an important factor even in models which
27evaluating two lotteries fL1;L2g, the minimum selling price for either of them is the lottery's
monetary valuation obtained by using the decision weights determined in fL1;L2g according
to Denitions 1 and 2. Formally, a local thinker with a value function v() prices L1 at:
Pmin(L1 jL2) = v
 1
"
X
s2S

1
sv(x
1
s)
#
, (26)
where 1
s is the decision weights of state s for lottery L1 in the context of its choice from
the set fL1;L2g. Here salience is determined by the consideration set fL1;L2g, which does
not coincide with the local thinker's choice set (since he is not choosing between the two
lotteries, he is pricing them). With a linear value function, the price Pmin(L1jL2) is the
expected value of L1 as perceived by the local thinker. If the local thinker is asked to price a
lottery in isolation, this approach suggests that he evaluates it together with the alternative
of not having the lottery, namely having zero for sure, L0  (0;1). We see this as a natural
way to model the elicitation of minimum selling prices in cases where { as in most preference
reversal experiments { subjects must state this price (potentially under an incentive scheme).
Alternatively, under the revealed preference approach, the minimum selling price is found
by revealed preference: the price of lottery L1 is then the minimum amount of money c1
such that adding the sure prospect Lc = (c1;1) to the choice set makes the local thinker
weakly prefer the sure prospect. In this approach, salience is determined by the decision
maker's actual choice set fL1;Lcg. In this section we adopt the valuation approach to study
reversals. In online Appendix 1, we show that our model can also yield reversals using
the revealed preference approach, but under more restricted circumstances than under the
valuation approach. Consistent with the dierence between the two approaches, experiments
that explicitly implemented the revealed preference approach found signicantly lower levels
of reversals (Bostic, Herrnstein and Luce 1989, see also Tversky, Slovic and Kahneman 1990).
In the preference reversal experiments, subjects are rst asked to price in isolation, and
preserve transitivity and are not context dependent.
28then to choose among, the following two independent lotteries:
L$ =
8
<
:
x; with prob. 0
0; 1   0
; L =
8
<
:
x; with prob. 
0; 1   
, (27)
where typically 0= =  = 1=2, as in the common ratio experiments. We know from (25)
that, with linear utility, the local thinker selects the safer lottery L when  > 2(1 )=(2 
 2). In the literature, we typically have  > 3=4, so this constraint holds for any   2=3.
Thus, when asked to choose, a local thinker having linear utility and  = 0:7 is risk averse
and prefers L to L$, just as most experimental subjects do.
In contrast, when the local thinker is asked to price the lotteries in isolation, he evaluates
each lottery relative to L0 = (0;1). In this comparison, each lottery's upside is salient. As a
consequence, since  = 1=2 the local thinker prices the lotteries as:
P(L jL0) = x
2  
+(1 ) ; P(L$ jL0) = x 
=2
=2+(1 =2). (28)
For any  < 1, the local thinker prices L$ higher than L in isolation, i.e.
P(L$ jL0) > P(L jL0).
Both lotteries are priced above their expected value, but L$ is more overpriced than L
because it pays a higher gain with a smaller probability, and from Proposition 1 we know
that lower probabilities are relatively more distorted.17
Thus, while in a choice context the local thinker prefers the safer lottery L, in isola-
tion he prices the risky lottery L$ higher, exhibiting a preference reversal. Crucially, this
behavior is not due to the fact that choosing and pricing are dierent operations. In fact,
in our model choosing and pricing are the same operation, as in standard economic the-
ory. Preference reversals occur because, unlike in standard theory, evaluation in our model
is context dependent. Pricing and choosing dier because the underlying evaluations are
17These predictions are borne out by the literature as well as by our own experimental data. Tversky,
Slovic and Kahneman (1990) show that preference reversals follow from overpricing of L$ in isolation, and
that L is not underpriced. Our model predicts that decision makers price L close to its expected value
because it oers an extremely high probability of winning, which is hardly distorted.
29performed in dierent contexts. One noteworthy feature of our model is that it generates
preference reversals through violations of \procedural invariance", dened by Tversky, Slovic
and Kahneman (1990) as situations in which a subject prices a lottery above its expected
value, P(L1jL0) > E(x1
s), and yet prefers the expected value to the lottery, L1  (E(x1
s);1).
Tversky, Slovic and Kahneman (1990) show that the vast majority of observed reversals fol-
low from the violations of procedural invariance, as predicted by our model. Regret Theory
can also generate preference reversals, using the revealed preference approach to determine
certainty equivalents (Loomes and Sugden 1983). These reversals are not due to violations
of procedural invariance (in contrast to the evidence), but due to intransitivity in choice.
One distinctive implication of our context-based explanation is that reversals between
choice and pricing should only occur when pricing takes place in isolation but not if decision
makers price lotteries in the choice context itself. We tested this hypothesis by giving subjects
a choice between lotteries L$ = (16;0:31; 0;0:69) and L = (4;0:97; 0;0:03), which Tversky,
Slovic and Kahneman (1990) found to lead to a high rate of preference reversals. Subjects
stated their certainty equivalents for the two lotteries, in isolation and in the context of
choice.18 Our model then predicts that preference reversal should occur between choice and
pricing in isolation, but not between choice and pricing in the choice context.19
Despite considerable variation in subjects' evaluations (which is a general feature of such
elicitations, see Grether and Plott (1979), Bostic, Herrnstein and Luce (1990), Tversky,
Slovic and Kahneman (1990)), the results are consistent with our predictions. First, among
the subjects who chose L over L$, the average (avg) price of L in isolation was lower than
the average price of L$ in isolation:
avg[P(L jL0)] = 4:6 < avg[P(L$ jL0)] = 5:2 .
Thus, our subject pool exhibits the standard preference reversal between choice and average
18In our experimental design, each subject priced each lottery only once, and dierent lotteries were priced
in dierent contexts. This design ensures that subjects do not deform their prices to be consistent with their
choices; however, it also implies that preference reversals are not observed within-subject but only at the
level of price distributions across subject groups (see online Appendix 2 for more details).
19This prediction does not change if we allow for the option L0  (0;1) to be included in the choice set.
See online Appendix 1 for details on choice among more than two lotteries.
30pricing in isolation.20
Second, preference reversals subside when we compare choice and pricing in the choice
context. In fact, in this context the same subjects priced their chosen lottery L higher, on
average, than the alternative risky lottery L$:
avg[P(LjL$)] = 4:3 > avg[P(L$jL)] = 4:1
As predicted by our model, in the choice context the average price ranking is consistent with
choice.21 One may object that this agreement is caused by the subjects' wish to be coherent
when they price just after a choice. However, each subject priced only one of the lotteries
in the choice context.22 It appears to be the act of comparing the lotteries that drives their
evaluation during choice, and not (only) an adjustment of value subsequent to choice.
Another potential objection is that our experiments do not elicit true selling prices. It
is well known that it is dicult to design price elicitation mechanisms for subjects who
violate the independence axiom of Expected Utility Theory. To avoid these problems, Cox
and Epstein (1989) study preference reversals by only eliciting the ranking of selling prices
across lotteries. In their experiments, Cox and Epstein directly compared lotteries to each
other, so their procedure can be viewed as eliciting evaluations in the context of choice. They
nd some evidence of preference reversals, but crucially they show that these reversals are
equally likely in both directions (from risk averse choice to risk seeking pricing, and from risk
seeking choice to risk averse pricing). Symmetric reversal patterns are typically attributed
20This reversal holds not only with respect to average prices but also for the distribution of prices we
observe. Assuming that subjects draw evaluations randomly from the price distributions, we estimate that
around 54% of the subjects who choose L would exhibit the standard preference reversals (see online
Appendix 2). The average prices above imply that some subjects priced the safer lottery L above its
highest payo. Such overpricing can occur even in a laboratory setting and with incentives schemes (Grether
and Plott 1974, Bostic et al 1990), perhaps due to misunderstanding of the pricing task. In online Appendix
2 we consider truncations of the data that lters out such overpricing.
21In our data, the distribution for P(LjL$) does not dominate that for P(L$jL). This is due to the
fact that: i) on average subjects attribute similar values to both lotteries in the choice context, and ii) there
is substantial variability in choice (and thus in pricing), as about half the subjects chose each lottery. In
online Appendix 2 we look in a more detailed way at the manifestation and signicance of fact ii) in light
on Tversky, Slovic and Kahneman's (1990) analysis of preference reversals.
22We ran another version of the survey where we asked the subjects to price the lotteries under comparison
but without having to choose between them. In line with the valuation approach, these subjects exhibited
similar behavior on average, namely pricing L$ higher than L in isolation, but similarly to L under
comparison.
31to arbitrary uctuations in evaluation, see Bostic et al (1990) (although Cox and Epstein
interpreted them as akin to a violation of procedural invariance). Thus we interpret Cox
and Epstein's results as consistent with our prediction that systematic preference reversals
subside when prices are elicited in a choice context.
These results suggest that choice and pricing may follow the same fundamental principle
of context-dependent evaluation. Preferences based on choice could dier from those inferred
from pricing in isolation because they represent evaluations made in dierent contexts.
5.3 Reection and Framing Eects
KT (1979) show that experimental subjects tend to shift from risk aversion to risk seeking as
gains are reected into losses. Our model yields these shifts in risk attitudes solely based on
the salience of payos, without relying on the S-shaped value function of Prospect Theory. To
see this, consider the choice between lottery L1 = (x1
s;s)s2S and sure prospect L2 = (x;1),
both of which are dened over gains (i.e. x1
s;x > 0) and have the same expected value
E(x1
s) = x. For a local thinker with linear value function:
V
LT(L1) =
X
s2S
s!
1
sx
1
s = E(x
1
s) + cov[!
1
s;x
1
s] (29)
where cov[!1
s;x1
s] =
P
s2S s [!1
s   1][x1
s   x] (recall that E(!1
s) = 1). Thus, the local thinker
is risk averse, choosing L2 over L1, when cov[!1
s;x1
s] < 0. If then L1 and L2 are reected
into lotteries L0
1 = ( x1
s;s)s2S and L0
2 = ( x;1), property 3) in Denition 1 implies that
the salience ranking among states does not change. As a result, the same decision maker is
risk seeking, choosing L0
1 over L0
2 when:
cov

!
1
s; x
1
s

=  cov

!
1
s;x
1
s

> 0, (30)
which is fullled if and only if the decision maker was originally risk averse. Intuitively, a
salient downside inducing risk aversion in the gain domain becomes a salient upside inducing
risk seeking in the loss domain. Our model thus yields the fourfold pattern of risk prefer-
32ences23 without assuming a value function that is concave for gains and convex for losses.
With the same logic our model can account for the Tversky and Kahneman (1981) famous
framing experiments, even with a linear value function.
Consider the Public Health Dilemma, which describes the outbreak of a disease that is
expected to kill 600 people. When the choice between medical responses is framed in terms
of lives saved (respectively lost), the local thinker species the payos as gains (respectively
losses). In the lives saved frame, the most salient outcome is the one where nobody is saved,
leading to a risk-averse choice, while in the lives lost frame, the most salient outcome is the
one where nobody dies, triggering a risk-seeking choice.
Note, however, that in our model reection of risk attitudes is a knife-edge property: it
holds only if the decision maker's value function is linear. A concave value function v()
in the loss domain would play against the reection of salient payos, creating an intrinsic
preference for a moderate and certain loss. The distinction between the salience of payos
and the curvature of the value function can provide insight into ndings that reection of
risk attitudes is only partial and decreases with payo magnitude (Laury and Holt, 2005).
6 Taking Stock
We now take stock by summarizing the role of dierent assumptions in generating our results
and by comparing our predictions to those of Prospect Theory. Denote by \Ordering" the
ordering property, by \DS" the diminishing sensitivity property, and by \Odds" the property
of Denition 2 that distortions do not depend on probability odds. Table 2 summarizes how
our model and Prospect Theory account for Allais Paradoxes and preference reversals.24
Anomalies in our model can be driven by a change in the salience ranking of payos
(such as the Allais common consequence paradox) or by the dierential distortion of small
probabilities (such as the Allais common ratio paradox, where the salience ranking does not
23The four-fold pattern of risk preferences refers to risk seeking behavior for gambles with small probabil-
ities of gains and gambles with moderate or large probabilities of losses, and risk averse behavior when the
signs of payos are reversed, see Tversky, Slovic and Kahneman (1990).
24Tables 2 and 3 list the main properties that drive each eect in either theory, but are not exhaustive.
We use the 1979 version of Prospect Theory, but the cumulative version (TK, 1992) is very similar for the
purpose of this comparison.
33Salience Theory Prospect Theory
Allais Common Consequence Ordering and DS Sub-certainty of (p)
Allais Common Consequence (correlated) Ordering Editing (but not explicit)
Allais Common ratio Ordering, DS and Odds Sub-additivity of (p)
Allais Common ratio (correlated) Ordering Isolation eect (Editing)
Preference Reversals Ordering, DS and Odds No
Preference Reversals (choice) Ordering No
Table 2: Taking stock of Anomalies
change). The ordering property plays a crucial role throughout, determining the direction
of the choice anomalies.
By providing insight into what drives the anomalies, the model also identies circum-
stances where the anomalies disappear. Crucially, these follow from the same properties that
cause the anomalies to begin with. Anomalies disappear when the choice problems are set
up so that the representation of each lottery is stable for the decision maker across dierent
treatments { e.g. when the common consequence is made evident in the Allais paradox.
The situation with Prospect Theory is very dierent. Each Allais paradox is explained
through a dierent assumption about the probability weighting function, or on the edit-
ing process which is not formally modeled. Finally, Prospect Theory cannot account for
preference reversals, since choice follows from context-independent evaluation.
Consider now another well-documented choice pattern: the four-fold pattern of risk pref-
erences (TK, 1992): risk aversion (RA) for gains of high probability, risk seeking (RS) for
gains of low probability, and the reverse for losses. As shown in Section 4 for gains, and
in Section 5.3 for losses, our model reproduces this pattern based solely on the properties
of salience (including that diminishing sensitivity depends on the magnitude of payo level,
and not their sign, as encoded in the reection property of Denition 1). We further predict
that risk attitudes should depend on the payo level x. In light of the experimental results of
Section 4, we adopt the convexity property of Denition 3, whereby diminishing sensitivity
gets weaker as payo levels increase. These predictions are summarized in Table 3 for choices
34between a sure payo and a mean-preserving spread.
for gains Salience Theory Prospect Theory
RA for high p DS Concave v() and sub-certainty of (p)
RS for low p, high x Ordering v() low curvature, (p) > p for small p
x-dependent switch to RS Ordering, DS Non-linear v()
RA for low p, low x DS, convexity v() very concave for low x
for losses Salience Theory Prospect Theory
RS for high p DS Convex v() and sub-certainty of (p)
RA for low p, high jxj Ordering v() low curvature, (p) > p for small p
x-dependent switch to RA Ordering, DS Non-linear v()
RS for low p, low jxj DS, convexity v() very convex for low jxj
Table 3: Taking stock of Risk Attitudes (RA: risk aversion, RS: risk seeking)
In Prospect Theory, the main driver of risk attitudes is the curvature of the value function.
As discussed in Section 4, dierent patterns of risk attitudes put dierent constraints on this
function, which can be hard to reconcile. Our context dependent account of risk preferences
does not require any assumptions on the curvature of the value function. Instead, that role
is taken by the diminishing sensitivity property of the salience function.
Regret Theory is also able to account for several patterns of choice under risk by assum-
ing that states with higher payo dierences play a disproportionate role in choice. This
intuition is closely related to ordering. To account for the Allais paradoxes, however, Re-
gret Theory requires an additional convexity assumption which, as noted by the authors,
lacks an independent psychological basis. More important, by focusing exclusively on payo
dierences and neglecting diminishing sensitivity, Regret Theory can capture neither the
dependence of risk attitudes on the payo level x, nor framing eects and violations of
procedural invariance, as previously noted.
In sum, we think that our model provides a parsimonious account of context dependent
shifts in risk preference based on psychologically founded assumptions about the nature and
the impact of the perceptual salience of lottery payos.
357 Conclusion
Our paper explores how cognitive limitations cause people to focus their attention on some
but not all aspects of the world, the phenomenon we call local thinking. We argue that
salience, a concept well-known to cognitive psychology, shapes this focus. In the case of
choice under risk, this perspective can be implemented in a straightforward and parsimonious
way by specifying that contrast between payos shapes their salience, and that people inate
the decision weights associated with salient payos. Basically, decision makers overweight
the upside of a risky choice when it is salient and thus behave in a risk-seeking way, and
overweigh the downside when it is salient, and behave in a risk averse way. This approach
provides an intuitive and unied explanation of the instability of risk preferences, including
the dramatic switches from risk seeking to risk averse behavior resulting from seemingly
innocuous changes in the problem, as well as of some fundamental puzzles in choice under
risk such as the Allais paradox and preference reversals. It makes predictions for when these
paradoxes will and will not occur, which we test and conrm experimentally.
Other aspects of salience have been used by economists to examine the consequences
of people reacting to some pieces of data (salient ones) more strongly than to others. For
example, Chetty et al. (2009) show that shoppers are more responsive to sales taxes already
included in posted prices than to sales taxes added at the register. Barber and Odean (2008)
nd that stock traders respond to \attention grabbing" news. Perhaps most profoundly,
Schelling (1960) has shown that people can solve coordination problems by focusing on salient
equilibria based on their general knowledge, without any possibility for communication.
Memory becomes a potential source of salient data. Our formal approach is consistent with
this work, and stresses that in the specic context of choice under risk the relative magnitude
of payos is itself a critical determinant of salience.
Our specication of contrast as a driver of salience could be useful for thinking about a
variety of economic situations. For example, salience may aect consumer behavior: when
considering which of dierent brands to buy, a consumer might focus on the attributes where
the potential brands are most dierent, neglecting the others (see Tversky and Simonson
(1993), Bordalo (2011), Koszegi and Szeidl (2011)). We use a version of this paper's model
36of salience to investigate consumer choices more broadly, as well as the endowment eect
(Bordalo, Gennaioli and Shleifer, (2011, 2012)). In many applications, the key idea of
our approach is that mental frames, rather than being xed in the mind of the consumer,
investor, or voter, are endogenous to the contrasting features of the alternatives of choice.
This notion could perhaps provide a way to study how context shapes preferences in many
social domains.
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37Appendix
A. Proofs
Proposition 1 If the probability of state s is increased by ds = hs and the probabilities
of other states are reduced while keeping their odds constant, i.e. de s =   s
1 she s for all
e s 6= s, then for every lottery Li:
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The parenthesis on the right hand side can be rearranged to yield
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where the sum is now over all states r. Inserting this term back into the equation above we
get the result:
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Proposition 1 has the following corollary: let lottery L yield payo xm with total proba-
38bility pm, with
P
n pn = 1. Let m be the set of states where L pays xm, and denote elements
of m by sm;j, where j = 1;:::;jmj. Then pm =
P
sm;j2m sm;j = pm
P
sm;j2m e sm;j, where
we write e sm;j = sm;j=pm (if L is being compared to another lottery L0 and both lotteries
are independent, then e sm;j is just the probability that L0 gives payo yj where the set m is
equal to the state (xm;yj)). Denote the salience distortion of pm by
!m =
P
sm;j2m e sm;j
ksmj 1
P
n
P
sn;j2n e sn;j
ksnj 1  pn
Corollary 1 If the probability pm of payo xm is increased by dpm = hpm and the probabil-
ities of other states are reduced while keeping their odds constant, i.e. dpe m =  
pm
1 pmhpe m for
all e m 6= m, then:
d!s
h
=  
pm
1   pm
 !m  (!m   1)
The proof of Corollary 1 is parallel to that of Proposition 1.
Lemma 1: If the salience function is convex, then r = vLT(L0)   vLT(L1) weakly decreases
with x. Conversely, if the salience function is concave then r weakly increases with x.
Proof. First note that, due to linear utility, the premium r is independent of x for a given
salience ranking. In fact, for any salience ranking we have
v
LT (L0)   v
LT (L1) = x  
1
pg + (1   p)l

p
g (x + g) + (1   p)
l (x   l)

=
1
pg + (1   p)l

l(1   p)
l   gp
g
Second, note that if (x + g;x)   (x;x   l) increases in x, then the upside of the risky
lottery L1 becomes weakly more salient as x increases. In particular, if L1's upside goes from
being non salient (for low x) to being salient (for high x), the shift in r is negative:
l(1   p)   gp
p + (1   p)
 
l(1   p)   gp
p + (1   p)
/  p(1   p)
 
1   
2
[g + l]
which proves the claim when the salience function is convex (note that this shift goes to zero
as  approaches 1). The concave case is analogous.
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